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C
hina’s emergence as an economic gi-
ant during the past quarter century has
dramatically changed the global eco-
nomic landscape particularly in East Asia. Be-
tween 1995 and 2004, China’s economy grew
by an average of 9.1 percent (Table 1) and as
of 2005, it ranked second to the US in terms of
gross domestic product (GDP) measured in pur-
chasing power parity dollars (PPP$).
China’s global presence is largely felt in manu-
factured exports (Table 2). During the past 25
years, the share of China in global manufac-
tured exports has increased ten-fold and its
share of global manufactured imports, six-fold.
As of 2004, China has overtaken Japan in the
area of trade in manufactures. [The reasons for
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1 For example, see Lall and Albaladejo (2004) and Winters
and Yusuf (2006).
China’s phenomenal growth have been described and
analyzed by many experts and are not central to this pa-
per.]1
Table 1. Gross domestic product in six large economies
Economy Average real growth rate GDP in PPP$ Rank
1995-2004 2005 2005
China 9.1 8,572,666 2
India 6.1 3,815,553 4
United States 3.3 12,409,465 1
Japan 1.2 3,943,754 3
Germany 1.5 2,417,537 5
Brazil 2.4 1,627,262 9
Philippines 408,637 24
World 3.0
Source: Table 1.1 of Winters and Yusuf (2006), World Development Indicators
database, World BankPN 2006-08
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This paper examines the adverse and benefi-
cial effects of China’s meteoric rise on the
economies of Southeast Asia. The analysis then
looks at how the adverse effects can be miti-
gated and how the gains can be maximized,
with focus on the Philippines.
China as a threat
Taking the Philippines as a case study, three
main reasons are cited on why China is a threat:
z China produces cheap commodities
which have flooded the Philippine market, re-
sulting in the demise of local firms and loss of
employment opportunities.
z Lower-priced Chinese commodities di-
rectly compete with Philippine goods in the
international market. Specifically, traditional
goods like garments will find their way in the
American, Japanese, and European markets
while the nontraditional goods will gain
ground in the Middle Eastern market.
z China has been a favored destination for
foreign direct investments (FDIs), attracting 22
percent of investment flows into developing
economies in 2005 and 8 percent of world FDI
inflows.2
Taking a look first at the threat of competition
from China on Philippine exports, data shown
in Table 3 indicate that China virtually exports
none of the top two Philippine export com-
modities. This Philippine advantage, however,
may vanish once China’s industrial structure
becomes more sophisticated. Hence, the Phil-
ippines has to exert effort to maintain this ad-
vantage and at the same time, diversify into
other commodities. This, of course, is easier
said than done. This issue will be discussed in
more detail in a later section.
As for the deluge of Chinese goods into the
Philippines and other ASEAN countries, data
from the ASEAN Secretariat show a trade sur-
plus in Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, and the
Philippines in recent years. Other countries,
however, have a variable but growing trade
deficit. The overall deficit in ASEAN trade with
China totaled $3.8 billion in 2000 and $9.6
billion in 2005.3 The latter figure is less than 2
percent of the combined GNP of the 10 mem-
ber countries.
In terms of foreign investment, China has in-
deed attracted the bulk of FDI flowing to de-
veloping economies, almost doubling its share
of FDI stock between 1990 and 2000 (Table
4). However, attributing the poor FDI perfor-
mance of the Philippines to crowding out by
China is rather simplistic. The more important
question is why the Philippines has not attracted
Table 2. Share in manufactured exports and imports
1980 1990 2004
Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports
China 0.8 1.1 1.9 1.7 8.3 6.3
US 14.0 15.3 12.4 15.8 9.6 17.3
Japan 8.2 8.5 9.1 4.3 6.6 5.2
Source: Tables 2.1 and 2.2 of Yusuf, Nabeshima, and Perkins (2006), Comtrade database.
Table 3. How does China fare with regard to top Philippine
exports?
Philippines China
Top Philippine Exports 2003 Value ($M) Share (%) Value ($M) Share (%)
Electronic microassemblies 10145 28 263 .06
Monolithic integrated circuits,
nes 3146 8.7 0 0
Parts and accessories of
automatic data processing
machines and units thereof  2647 7.3 18228 4.2
Computer data storage units 2260 6.2 5766 1.3
Source of basic data: PCTAS
______________
2 Based on data from UNCTAD 2006 World Investment
Report.
3 This part was lifted from Thitapha Wattanapruttpaisan
“ASEAN-China partnership: a blossoming relationship.”
Bangkok Post, 5 October 2006.PN 2006-08
3
Policy Notes
as much FDI as its ASEAN neighbors. For ex-
ample, a total of $5.1 billion flowed into Viet-
nam from 2003-05 compared to only $2.3 bil-
lion for the Philippines.
The literature points to the following factors as
some of the most important determinants of
FDI—market and political factors like market
size and level of real income, worker skill lev-
els, availability of infrastructure and other re-
sources that facilitate efficient specialization of
production, trade policies, and political and
macroeconomic stability (Blomström and
Kokko 2003). Compared to Singapore, Thai-
land, Malaysia, and even Indonesia and Viet-
nam, the Philippines lags in many of these as-
pects.
China as an opportunity
China’s economic threat in the area of trade
seems to be exaggerated. Its rapid economic
growth may actually be a boon for developing
countries. This is succinctly explained by
Dimaranan et al. (2006):
“…three recent developments have the
potential to at least attenuate these
stark scenarios of relentless competi-
tion. One is the rise of two-way trade
in manufactures, which makes the re-
cipient the beneficiaries of improve-
ments in efficiency in their trading
partners. Another is the growth of glo-
bal product sharing, where part of the
production process is undertaken in
one economy and subsequent stages
are undertaken in another. This pro-
cess, fueled by improvements in trans-
port and trade facilitation, and in com-
munications, and frequently involving
foreign domestic investment linkages,
makes participants in this process ben-
eficiaries from, rather than victims of,
improvements in the competitiveness
of their partners. A third is recognition
Table 5. Share of China in ASEAN-5 exports and imports (%)
1995 2000 2004
Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports
Indonesia 3.8 3.7 4.5 6.0 7.3 8.8
Malaysia 2.6 2.2 3.1 3.9 6.7 9.9
Philippines 1.2 2.3 1.7 2.3 6.7 6.0
Singapore 2.3 3.2 3.9 5.3 8.6 9.9
Thailand 2.9 2.8 4.1 5.3 7.3 8.6
Japan 5.0 10.7 6.3 14.5 13.1 20.7
Source of basic data: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) CD-ROM, June 2005.
Table 4. Stock of inward foreign direct investment
1990 2000 2005
World ($M) 1,789,303 5,802,991 10,129,739
Developing ($M) 370,314 1,756,452 2,756,992
Share of total (%) 11.6 30.3 27.2
China ($M) 20,691 193,348 317,873
Share of world (%) 1.2 3.3 3.1
Share of developing (%) 5.6 11.0 11.5
Philippines ($M) 3,268 12,810 14,028
Source: UNCTAD 2006 World Investment Report
that trade expansion does not typically
involve more increases in the volumes
of exports of products currently ex-
ported to existing markets. Rather, de-
veloping countries typically expand the
range of products they export, im-
prove product quality, and export to
additional markets as their exports
grow.”
Data in Table 5 show that trade of the larger
ASEAN countries with China has been grow-
ing rapidly between 1995 and 2004. This is
likewise true for Japan. The trend reflects the
impact of the “rise of two-way trade in manu-
factures” and the “growth of global produc-
tion sharing.” The rise in electronics exports of
the Philippines to China (Table 6) is evidence
that the latter’s economic growth has benefited
the manufacturing sector of the Philippines.PN 2006-08
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Meanwhile, policymakers in the Philippines
should carefully review the country’s indus-
trial policy following recent findings that eco-
nomic diversification leads to higher incomes
(Rodrik 2004). Diversification would also en-
able developing countries to take advantage
of new export markets. In Table 3, the highest
ranking 6-digit export category of the Philip-
pines comprises 28 percent of total exports. In
the case of China, the highest ranking 6-digit
category is “parts and accessories of automatic
data processing machines and units thereof“
and as shown in the Table, it comprises only
4.2 percent of total exports.
The other area which provides great opportu-
nity for ASEAN countries is investment. For ex-
ample, Filipino investments are contracted in
China specifically in the areas of real estate
which includes resorts, shops, and villas; com-
merce such as shopping malls; and manufac-
turing such as brewerage, glass, and chemical
fiber. Investments in financial services are simi-
larly expanding with the establishment of the
Philippine Metro Bank in Xiamen and Beijing.
More importantly, China is slowly emerging
as a major source of FDI and foreign aid in
Southeast Asia.4 Data in Table 7 show that there
was a surge in outward FDI from China in
2005. Meanwhile, China’s FDI to ASEAN rose
from $137 million in 1995 to $226 million in
2004 although this is a small share of the $25
billion investment into ASEAN in 2004.5 A few
months ago, the Philippine government an-
nounced a package of $2 billion every year
for the next three years from China’s Exim
Bank. This has been earmarked to support the
ambitious infrastructure program laid out by
President Macapagal-Arroyo in her 2006 State-
of- the-Nation Address.
China’s eagerness to help its neighbors in their
economic development has led some analysts
to suggest that it is reviving Ancient China’s
tributary system which was started under the
Ming Dynasty and perfected under the Qing
(Cheow 2003). The basic idea then was that
the Chinese Emperor would give more favors
to the tributary states or kingdoms than he
would receive from them. For this generosity,
the Chinese emperor would get their respect
and goodwill and it also helps China establish
its external security environment. Whether this
is an emerging trend and how it affects the
geopolitical balance would be an interesting
issue to monitor.
The third area where cooperation with China
provides a valuable opportunity for ASEAN is
regional economic integration in East Asia. In
Table 6. Philippine electronics exports
Rank 1995 2005
Country Value, $M Country Value, $M
1st USA 1,829 Japan 4,846
2nd Singapore 640 Netherlands 3,531
3rd Thailand 597 China 3,502
4th Japan 563 USA 3,362
5th UK 503 Hong Kong 2,855
Total value of
electronic exports 5,834 27,299
Source: National Statistics Office
______________
4 See for example Jane Perlez, “China emerges as major
player in Asian aid.” International Herald Tribune. Septem-
ber 18, 2006
5 Data were obtained from the ASEAN Secretariat website.
Table 7. FDI outflows ($M)
2003 2004 2005
World 561,104 813,068 778,725
Japan 28,800 30,951 45,781
Developing 35,566 117,463
China -152 1,805 11,306
Hong Kong 5,492 45,716 32,560
Korea 3,426 4,658 4,312




this context, an important argument is that the
primary objective of efforts toward greater eco-
nomic integration is political in nature but the
economic windfall from these political gains
is substantial (Yap 2005). For example, a free
trade agreement (FTA) among countries in the
region will boost the political bargaining
power of the countries involved by signaling
that they have agreed to band together to pur-
sue common interests. Having China on its side
will definitely enhance the political stature of
ASEAN and vice versa. One area that can be
revived through advocacy by a China-ASEAN
front is the reform of the international finan-
cial architecture. Efforts toward such measures
were regrettably sidelined by the indifference
of the US Treasury.
Another important area that could be ad-
dressed jointly is the trans-Pacific macroeco-
nomic imbalance. Currently, the policy pro-
posals to correct this imbalance that are
played up in the media focus on the revalua-
tion of East Asian currencies, particularly the
yuan. A united East Asian front could throw its
weight toward a solution that emphasizes fis-
cal consolidation by the US, which makes more
economic sense. For example, imposing a 50
percent fuel tax in the US will address many
outstanding problems such as: 1) the surge in
international fuel prices and depletion of oil
reserves; 2) instability of international capital
flows; 3) the US fiscal deficit; and 4) the trans-
Pacific macroeconomic imbalance itself.
But this still begs the question of how to se-
cure these political gains since it is likely that
establishing a region-wide FTA—or closer eco-
nomic integration in general—and actually
securing political gains will both require po-
litical rapprochement, especially among the
“plus three” countries. This is similar to the view
that East Asian countries still lack sufficient
political will to promote economic integration
(Wang 2005). The essential issue then becomes
how to achieve political rapprochement or
political reconciliation, or how to build the
political will. The road toward this state of af-
fairs definitely goes through China.
Policy implications
The foregoing discussion yields an important
message.
The Philippines—and other ASEAN member
countries for that matter—has to set the condi-
tions for faster economic growth in order to
take advantage of the opportunities provided
by China’s emergence as an economic super-
power. This argument of course extends to the
opportunities provided by globalization. The
Philippines cannot afford to miss this opportu-
nity as it did in the 1980s when Japan sharply
increased its outward FDI.  Many of the condi-
tions necessary to benefit from China’s eco-
nomic expansion are internal in nature. This
would include the provision of better condi-
tions for domestic and foreign investors, a more
strategic and coherent industrial policy, and
better governance. The latter is particularly
necessary in order for the huge Official Devel-
opment Assistance (ODA) inflows to be effec-
tively and efficiently utilized.
Better conditions for domestic and foreign in-
vestors largely imply better physical infrastruc-
ture. As mentioned earlier, the Philippine gov-
ernment has recently laid out an ambitious
The Philippines—and other ASEAN member
countries for that matter—has to set the conditions
for faster economic growth in order to take advantage
of the opportunities provided by China’s emergence
as an economic superpower. This argument of course
extends to the opportunities provided by global-
ization. The Philippines cannot afford to miss this
opportunity as it did in the 1980s when Japan
sharply increased its outward FDI.PN 2006-08
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infrastructure program to address the gaps in
this area. What is equally important is crafting
a coherent industrial policy, which is an as-
pect that has been overlooked because of the
controversy it generates. Since 1972, Philip-
pine economic managers have followed a pro-
gram that largely mimicked the Washington
Consensus, thereupon not allowing for strate-
gic intervention on the part of the government.
This was largely due to doubts about the ca-
pacity to apply industrial policy, which leads
to the importance of governance and institu-
tions.
Recent work, however, has attempted to pro-
vide a pragmatic approach that eschews ideo-
logical prescriptions and instead looks more
closely at historical experience (Rodrik 2004,
Hausmann and Rodrik 2006). The basic argu-
ment is that industrial policy is as much about
eliciting information from the private sector
on significant externalities—primarily informa-
tion and coordination externalities—and their
remedies as it is about implementing appro-
priate policies. It also applies to the develop-
ment of nontraditional activities in agriculture
and services. Additionally, the use of indus-
trial policies should not imply that govern-
ments make production and employment de-
cisions. Instead, it requires that governments
play a ‘strategic and coordinating role’ in the
development of nontraditional activities—ac-
tivities where the underlying costs and oppor-
tunities are unknown to begin with and un-
fold only when such activities start. 
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